I undertook the assignment of writing this history to satisfy my historical curiosity. To understand what happened and why it happened. And wherever judgement appeared to be called for, to judge not by what happened but was expected to happen.

    History is built on rational explanation. By combining significant source material and memoirs with interviews of participants and personal knowledge, I have presented a reconstruction of events that is as accurate and authentic as I could make it. My aim has been to make the reader well informed enough to arrive at his own judgements.

    Broadly speaking, there are only two ways of responding to the problems of historical understanding of controversial incidents like the loss of the KHUKRI or the amphibious landing at Cox's Bazar. One is to say that the participants knew perfectly well why they undertook a particular operation but simply could not later admit the reason, for to do so might indicate their responsibility. The historian must ferret out the original motives and present a convincing reconstruction of the environment that may reveal the motives, or at least the main objectives of the principal players.

    A second broad approach is to try and explain a disaster in terms not of motive but rather of drift. If indeed there was no sharply defined purpose, then one is probably examining a vague process of institutional momentum. In this conception, a patently flawed idea that has been around for some time gradually acquires support simply because institutions and policy makers adapt to it and begin to calculate how they can use it to advantage. It is in this context that the section on the "Sinking of the KHUKRI" would provide food for thought in the extremely complex area of anti submarine warfare.

    The tragic loss of the KHUKRI will remain a vexed issue. If at all, a two ship Search and Attack Unit (SAU) had to be sailed to take on a submarine whose capabilities were known to be superior to those of the ships of the SAU, then the SAU should have been closely supported by all available anti submarine air effort - Seakings, Alizes and Super Connies. On the other hand, had KHUKRI been following well established torpedo counter measure procedures like high speed, zig-zags and weave, she would never have been such an easy target. The Captain of KHUKRI took the calculated risk of overcoming the limitations of his ship's sonar by doing slow speed and using the BARC developed sonar modification to help increase his sonar's detection range. Luck was not on his side.

    It is not my intention to invite controversy. Without trying to vindicate or to criticise, controversial events have been presented dispassionately, leaving judgement to the reader. I accept full responsibility for the facts as stated and the opinions expressed. I would welcome inputs which would help to make the next edition more accurate.

    Although this volume of the history has been sponsored by the Indian Navy, the views and the interpretation to facts are entirely my own. They are not necessarily either those of the Indian Navy or of the Government.

    To make it easier for the lay reader, contemporary names of countries have been freely used such as Britain for United Kingdom, America for USA and Russia for Soviet Union etc.

    There is a saying "The past is a work of art, free of irrelevancies and loose ends". My hope has been to recreate past events after enough time has elapsed to recollect them in relative tranquility, but not before the "irrelevancies and loose ends", which are the spice of history, have disappeared.