MEATBALL June 2006
 

YOU SAID IT

Wg Cdr N Taneja

Aviation in the Armed Forces:

The Need for Collaborative Operational Research

Let me pose three theoretical yet very (in my opinion) pertinent questions: -

·    What are the main causes of aviation accidents in the Indian Air Force (IAF), Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Army (IA)? What are the reasons for differences, if any?

·    Is backache or disease of the spine more prevalent among aircrew from any given services?

·    Is there any difference in prevalence of fatigue among the services?

The honest answer to all three as far as I know is ‘we don’t know’. And in my personal opinion all three are very pertinent questions that have significant flight safety implications, besides long term affects on aircrew health.

Let me address the three questions individually. As far as the first question is concerned, each organisation has its own system of investigating every incident and accident. A Court of Inquiry investigates each aviation accident and the proceedings of the Court are archived at the Headquarters level. In the case of the Air Force, it is the Directorate of Flight Safety. Navy and the Army will obviously have some similar procedure and guidelines for archival retrieval and analysis of Courts of Inquiry.

However, if one were to attempt to compare data across the three organisations, it will soon be evident that this is an onerous if not impossible, task. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the accident investigation methodologies and report writing may be different. Second and more importantly, the error framework utilised to classify and investigate accidents appear to be different. The IAF till recently exclusively used the free form format of what happened, why it happened and how it happened. Since the past year however, the DFS has mandated the use of a supplementary classification system called Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for each Court of Inquiry. The free form text framework makes comparison across databases extremely difficult if not impossible since it can lead to a great deal of subjectivity and individual biases. Things looked for and found may not be mentioned or some tenets may not have been looked at. Will HFACS become the common error framework across the three services? Even if such a system or any other common error framework is adopted ‘off the shelf’ there are inherent inconsistencies in terminologies across each organisation. These were recently brought out during the development of DoD HFACS in the US, where they have now come to a consensus classification system across the armed forces.

Third, the background and expertise of the individual analysing the data can also influence the conclusions drawn and recommendations made from any study, in particular when the data is not structured.

Fourth, the organisational safety culture influences the way Courts of Inquiry are conducted. One culture may encourage reporting violations and organisational lapses (a reporting culture) that may have had contributed to incidents and accidents, whereas the other may not. These differences have also been well documented in literature and may be evident within our armed forces too.

The second question concerns the prevalence of spinal disabilities in aircrew among the three services. The Dept of Human Engineering and Human Factors is the nodal centre for evaluation of aircrew with musculoskeletal disabilities. Let us say that it appears the number of aircrew with low back pain in the IN is less than that in the IAF. It is possible that this is linked with the total number of aircrew in each service. But at present there is no tri-service group that can address this and many such issues of common interest to the Armed Forces. Differences in the prevalence of any disability can provide insights into the underlying causative/aggravating factors and then assist in developing intervention programs. While the office of DGAFMS pools and compares information across the three services every year, there is no system yet in place to compare and analyse aviation data on similar lines. Such data needs to take into account the total number of aircrew in each service. Until we have some such group capable of comparing data, we will have to wait for this answer for some time.

    My third question is on fatigue.  Fatigue in aviation activities is an issue that is attracting renewed attraction in both military and civil aviation. Our organisations also have an interest in understanding fatigue in aviation duties. Mid-air refuelling capabilities and NVG flying have added new dimensions to aircrew fatigue. While isolated articles in flight safety magazines of IAF and IN talk of addressing fatigue among aircrew and support personnel, there is no concrete data on the attitudes awareness, prevalence and countermeasures adopted by the personnel from the three services with regards to fatigue. Again, such data can provide critical insights into useful strategies. Knowledge and best practices from one service can possibly be applied in the other without having to reinvent the wheel.

So, what can be done to generate data on such relevant issues? It is the authors personal opinion that a ‘tri-service operational aerospace medicine research group’ can provide answers to questions like those posed in this article. Such a group can address issues as mandated by the operational community and design interventions that may be generic across the three services or specific to each organization. Whatever form and shape this group assumes, it is my strong belief that it is a necessity for the present and future.